Rod Braithwaite, Information Systems Consultant
Andrew Stein[HREF1], Lecturer, Information Systems, Victoria University Andrew.stein@vu.edu.au
Paul Hawking[HREF1], Senior Lecturer, Information Systems, Victoria University paul.hawking@vu.edu.au
David Wyld[HREF3], Associate Professor of Management, Southeastern Louisiana University, USA dwyld@selu.edu
In the late 1990’s, online Business-to-Business (B2B) reverse auctions (E-RA’s) proliferated and were adopted in a wide variety of circumstances. The reverse auction format evolved to take advantage of Internet technology and reverse auctions have been identified by many large organisations as a tool to achieve substantial procurement savings. As companies adopt this technology it is important for them to understand the implications of this type of procurement. This paper adopts a case study approach to identify the issues for both buyers and sellers using this type of B2B application. It describes the conduct of multiple reverse auctions in a large Australian global company viewed through the eyes of the buyer undertaking a reverse auction. The main finding of the paper is the keen acceptance of the E-RA model and its ability to drive down costs across the procurement process.
Many research organisations predict massive growth in the B2B market. Bowles (2000) sees the global B2B market growing to US$1.551 billion in 2004. Yet, these figures pale into insignificance when considering other market analysts’ predictions: · Gartner: $US2.9trillion by 2003, · AMR: $US5.7 trillion by 2004, and, · Forrester: $US7.29 trillion by 2004 (Regan, 2001; Hersch, 2000; Diba, 2001). These predictions should be accepted with caution, however. In a recent article in Management Research News, Wyld (2002) cautions that we are entering the end of the “trough of disillusionment” phase of e-Business, where exponential gains in efficiencies and cost reductions will be replaced with incremental progress. Yet, there does seem to be a “sea change” in how procurement is conducted in organisations. B2B has promised - and delivered in many instances - to drive costs down and streamline procurement operations (McGarvey, 2000). Metcalfe (2001) predicted that European companies could achieve a 50% gain in productivity through adopting internet-enabled B2B processes by 2010. One mechanism that facilitates B2B e-procurement is the reverse online auction. The Electronic Reverse Auction (e-RA) assembles suppliers in one (virtual) location and creates a competitive selling environment. In a normal auction environment buyers bid upwards against each other to buy something but in the case of an E-RA the sellers bid under each other until the lowest price is found (Gabbard, 2003). Like a traditional auction, the key aspect of the e-RA is the sharing of bid information with the other bidders - this creates a feedback loop and stimulates further competition. Reverse online auctions can be delivered by intermediaries or via in-house applications. The rhetoric of B2B collaboration has “win-win” scenarios for all who participate in online auctions but is this true when e-RA vendors promise to deliver savings of up to 20% for the buying organisations. This paper will present a case study of an Australian reverse online auction asking the basic question: what is the value proposition of the reverse online auction in B2B e-commerce?
Electronic Reverse Auctions are usually held over the Internet with the E-RA application accessed by the seller via web browser. The auction event itself can be hosted by the buyer, or can be run through a third-party provider such as FreeMarkets, ChemConnect or World Wide Retail Exchange. There are two basic methods in which an Electronic Reverse Auction can be held - full service and self-service. In a full service E-RA the suppliers are found, pre-qualified and invited to the auction by the auction provider - the buyer specifies what they want and the E-RA service provider does the rest. A self-service E-RA’s is where the E-RA provider provides only the auction event. The buyer carries out the sourcing, pre-qualifications, invitations and other associated activities. Self-service E-RA’s also include those that are held and hosted by the buyer using their own (or third party) software. E-RA’s can also be public and open to anyone to bid at, or private and by invitation only (Gabbard, 2003). The rules and workings behind an E-RA vary according to provider and buyer preference. The form of feedback to the bidder on the acceptance and success of their bid can range from the bidder being told exactly how far off their bid is from becoming successful in dollars, where they are ranked amongst other bidders, or simply that their bid is unsuccessful. The rules of bidding can vary, with minimum and maximum bid increments, minimum and maximum variance from previous bid, bidder elimination from lack of bidding activity in a specified timeframe and other rules designed to encourage competition or maintain an ethical environment.
The auction model has settled into the B2B marketplace and has been developed for various e-Government and commercial applications (NSW, 2001). Wyld (2000) saw the auction model being adaptable for use in: · Procurement; · Disposition of used assets, and · Internal corporate management. There are several differing auction formats used in online auctions, including: · English; · Yankee; · Dutch; · Sealed bid; · Vickrey, and · Forward and Reverse Auctions (Wyld, 2000). Kafka et al (2000) predicted that by 2004, $US746 billion of business will be conducted through online auction models, based on dynamic pricing. One of the pioneers of online B2B auctions for e-procurement is Freemarkets, which was established in 1995 and launched their online auction site in 1999. To date, they have conducted auctions involving more than 19,000 suppliers from more than 70 countries worth $US30 billion (Freemarkets 2002). In the first quarter of 2000, they conducted auctions involving 47 Fortune 500 buyers and 4000 suppliers (Jan and Wu 2000). Mayne Group, one of Australia’s leading companies with major interests in health-care and logistics, signed a three-year deal in 2000 with Freemarkets to manage their procurement and operate online auctions. Other major B2B auction facilitators include: · Ariba; · CommerceOne; · Andale; · Elcom.com; · Procuree; and · Verticalnet. The B2B auction facilitators usually work with buyers to select bidders to participate in each auction, develop specifications in detail, and tailor the bidding process to the situation. This service is billed to buyers accordingly. There could be additional costs, based on a percentage of the anticipated savings (Messmer 2000). Freemarkets (2002) promotes the ability of their auction format to decrease services prices by 16-18% and goods by 2-3%. The reverse auction process involves intensive work on behalf of the buyer and market maker to structure the bidding process and prepare suppliers for qualification. This process is shown in Stein et al.(2003).
The primary objective of this case study was to analyse a major Australian companies foray into the e-Business killer application of reverse auction procurement. Four different process centres are analysed with both buyer and supplier viewpoint presented. More specifically, the research questions to be addressed in this study are: · RQ1: How is an online auction conducted? · RQ2: What are the business impacts of the online auction? · RQ3: Does reverse auctioning have a future?
Case study research methodology was used in this research, as this project represented an exploratory look at implications of reverse online auctions. Yin (1994, p.35) emphasises the importance of asking “what” when analysing information systems. Yin goes further and emphasises the need to study contemporary phenomena within real life contexts. Walsham (2000, p.204) supports case study methodology and sees a need for a move away from traditional information systems research methods, such as surveys, toward more interpretative case studies, ethnographies and action research projects. Several works (Chan & Roseman, 2001; Lee, 1989; Benbasat et al., 1987) have used case studies in presenting information systems case-study research. Cavaye (1996) used case study research to analyse inter-organisational systems and the complexity of information systems. The data collection process for the present research included: · Examination of existing documentation; · Content analysis of email; · Interview of actors; and · Direct observations.
Our case study company (AusResources), a wholly owned Australian affiliate of a very large multinational resources organization, conducted their first E-RA two years ago. They have since conducted nine more multi-year agreements on supply of both goods and services with annual business volumes from $1m to over $20m, with terms from 1to 5 years. Over the same period, the company conducted around 250 traditional paper based tenders ranging in value from under $100,000 to over $500m, from spot work over one month to multi-year agreements of up to five years. These agreements include: services only; services with incidental materials; materials with incidental services; materials only and are predominately enabling agreements. The company’s business practices guidelines for procurement contracting favor using competitively bid agreements. Justification is required for sole-source agreements so theoretically the majority of agreements awarded lend themselves to be awarded through an E-RA. The company is in the process of implementing a global platform for procurement sourcing worldwide that contains an E-RA application. Based on Ariba, the platform also contains knowledge management and workflow tools, a database that contains details on all agreements worldwide over $USD50k and an analysis tool for manipulating and reporting supply agreements data. Until recently, the parent company (and the local affiliate) used the service provider FreeMarkets (with Ariba E-RA application) to host its E-RA’s. The most recent E-RA held by the local affiliate was performed on the company’s new E-RA system.
There are three main drivers behind the company’s’ decision to hold an E-RA instead of a sealed bid tender: · To test the market when entering into that marketplace for the first time (i.e. where the company has not previously had supply agreements in place); · Allow new competitors in the marketplace an opportunity to bid for business (when an existing agreement has expired and is to be re-awarded); · To revalue a marketplace that has become more competitive when re-awarding an expired agreement. The opportunities for holding E-RA’s are few and far between in the example company. Supply of generic and commodity type goods and services such as temporary staff, office supplies and equipment, safety equipment and site security services lend themselves to the E-RA. Goods and Services that are more closely related to the core business or have special logistical considerations cannot be easily procured through the E-RA, if at all. This is due to specific types of equipment being used on site and the switching costs involved. The company has in place standards of business conduct which preclude the use of E-RA’s to force an existing supplier to reduce their prices (bid shopping), creating phantom bidders to manipulate the auction or providing unfair assistance to bidders. The company is aware of supplier suspicion and resistance of the E-RA concept and has configured the E-RA application to prevent misuse or manipulation and further they have also integrated into the E-RA application employee training to reduce supplier resistance.
The primary benefit expected by the company is lower prices. Agreements emanating from an E-RA are generally expected to come in ten percent lower than the agreement being replaced. In actuality the reduction has been greater than anticipated. The company does not expect reductions of this magnitude the next time around. Many Companies anticipate the E-RA cost reduction with the initial E-RA agreements shaking out the marketplace (Gabbard, 2003). Reduction of procurement negotiation cycle times is currently seen as a secondary benefit of holding an E-RA. The lead-up to the traditional RFT process can take many weeks (even months) depending on the complexity of the agreement. In theory, holding an E-RA will reduce total procurement time by the tender examination period, which is usually four weeks. Thus the time saved is not as high a reward as the reduction in spend, or the benefits from the new procurement management application (sharing information between affiliates, implementing world-wide agreements and having a common procedure set for procurement activities).
The preparations for an E-RA are the same as for traditional awarding of agreements. The company examines the marketplace and, if required, a Request For Information (RFI) is sent to selected suppliers. After the RFI’s are examined a final specification is formulated. Traditionally, Requests For Tenders (RFT’s) are sent to potential suppliers and sealed tenders are invited over a specified period. After the tender submission period, the tenders are opened and examined for another period, typically four weeks, and then awarded. The E-RA process differs from the traditional process where instead of calling for tenders, suppliers are invited to the E-RA event. Prior to the E-RA event, bidders are pre-qualified not only in their capacity to supply but, if applicable, their ability to conform to the company’s operations and controls management systems. The company operates within strict operations and management systems and suppliers of operations and sensitive goods and services are audited prior to and during any agreement period. Bidders in the current E-RA’s have been pre-existing suppliers that were already pre-qualified. To prepare bidders for the E-RA, the company sends an instruction document on how to use the E-RA application and details of the specific auction to the bidder. A dummy auction is held if required, with the company staff member hosting the event walking the bidder through the process. The bidders are given a user ID if not already a registered user and a password to log-in to the auction web site. In cases where the specifications are complex, the company may conduct a hybrid process where an RFP takes place and followed up by the E-RA. This enables the company to check that the bidders are fully aware of the specifications of the agreement that is up for bidding. In these cases, the bidders are told of the process to take place from the outset. The basic rules of the auction have been the same for all the auctions held so far: bids are accepted through the online event only (not via phone, fax etc) and bids are final and cannot be withdrawn. The auctions have been for the “whole basket” - the lot is not broken up into components. The feedback to the bidder works on a ranking system where the bids are shown only where they are in relation to other bids and what their own bids have been. The bids are only accepted if they fall with a range as determined in the rules of the auction - the range is set to specific percent or dollar values as part of the configuration of the E-RA prior to the event. Also in the configuration of the E-RA are the vendors’ penalty factors. These are adjustments to the bid price to give an actual price to the company and allow for such things as exchange rate, switching costs and transportation costs. These penalty factors are disclosed to the bidders prior to the event and affect the bid ranking position. As is the case with other companies such as Volkswagen, GlaxoSmithKline and METRO Group, the lowest bid is not always awarded the agreement. One of the terms of the E-RA is that the company reserves the right not to award to the lowest bidder. If the winning bid is invalid, the company will re-hold the E-RA. E-RA Results Of eight E-RA’s sampled, three were for materials or equipment supply, three for services only and two for services and incidental materials. Half have been awarded to the previous agreement holder, one was for a newly created agreement and the three remaining were awarded to different (i.e. not previous incumbent) contractors. All of the bidders in all of the E-RA’s were suppliers to the company in some capacity - either current agreement holders or ad hoc suppliers. By default this meant that all the bidders had at least some pre-qualification to adequately supply. The three agreements for supply of materials or equipment have provided the greatest savings - the reductions in these types of agreements have been 13%, 18% and 20% against forecast reductions of 9%, 10% and 20% respectively. Two of the agreements were for generic materials or equipment and one was for goods built to specification (product packaging). Pure services and services plus incidental materials based agreements did not return the same results but still performed better than expected. The agreement value reduction expected in these cases ranged from 5% to 10% but in reality yielded 12% to 15%. Previous agreements of these types were formed with transparent pricing as the contractor rates and mark-up on labour, materials and equipment were set out in the terms and conditions of the agreement. The lower forecast reductions came from the belief that the example company was contracting closer to the lowest market value than for materials or equipment only agreements. It was thought that it held a stronger negotiating position because it was more aware of the contractor’s costs and profit levels. The two largest agreements awarded through E-RA were both five-year agreements with values of approximately $20m - one for services and the other for materials. The service agreement reduction was 12% (against forecast 5%) and the materials only agreement reduction was 20%, which was forecast. The services only agreement included provision for rate increases in line with labour rate increases (Enterprise Bargaining Agreement increases) and bonuses linked with meeting targeted KPI’s, which may explain the successful bidders competitiveness and drive to win the agreement.
TWorldwide, the company has had success with the E-RA’s it has held so far. It is putting a lot of resources into improving strategic sourcing, and one of the cornerstones of this is the E-RA. All of the company’s procurement professionals are in the process of being trained in the use of the new system (and migrating from the FreeMarkets/Ariba system) with the expectation using E-RA’s with greater frequency. Locally, when training is completed it is envisaged that the E-RA will be more widely used, the company expecting to hold up to three E-RA’s per month in 2004. These will be agreements that are new to the E-RA process - none of the agreements awarded by E-RA previously are due to expire in 2004. Agreements awarded via E-RA will start to expire in 2005 and as already stated our example company does not expect the same reductions in spend after the second E-RA. The E-RA is seen primarily as a single-shot device to revalue a marketplace but it is also of value in awarding agreements in future negotiations due to the secondary advantages behind the process. Historically, the opportunities to use E-RA’s have been limited due to the lack of bidders and the nature of the goods and services that the company uses. The various equipment types used in the company operations are often sourced on specification and it can be difficult to find a vendor who can stock the required range. Provision of services to the company’s remote locations mean that a contractor may have significant start-up costs which are usually passed on. This is particularly relevant in the large service agreements for maintenance and construction activities where current contractors have significant investment in facilities to service our example company. These factors will affect just how many more agreements can be negotiated through E-RA instead of the traditional sealed bid tender process. Our example company also had some learning experiences along the way. Significant resistance to the E-RA was found in one E-RA event when a traditional sealed bid tender was changed to an E-RA after the tender lodgment period was closed. The bidders in this particular E-RA threatened to boycott the event and only made token bids in the auction event. Also hampering the introduction of new E-RA application was disruption to the training for Australian users due to technical issues. The training was done theoretically (no hands-on training) and refresher training has been scheduled. This doesn’t mean that the company cannot perform an E-RA now - the E-RA events are web based and it has resources in other affiliates to run E-RA’s in the meantime. All told, our example company has had success with using E-RA’s and will certainly keep using them where it can. Two impacts from the Wyld (2000) Model of e-Procurement seem to be supported in this case study. There was a considerable shift of power from the supplier to the buyer. This was evidenced by the dramatic drop in contract spend. The market makers did also increase competition within the marketplace, as evidenced by the increase in bidders in the auction format. The imperatives for the buyer in the Wyld (2000) Model of e-Procurement were supported, as: · Suppliers were leveraged into the auction portal; · A strategic alliance was formed between the buyer and auction vendor; and · An internal linkage was created between the supply chain and the auction portal.
After conducting a number of interviews with companies involved in reverse auctions, Smeltzer and Carr (2000) found that buyers were initially attracted to online auctions due to the promise of reduced acquisition prices. They believed that suppliers would be motivated to participate in auction events by improved communications and knowledge about the market and the opportunity to obtain increased sales. Reverse online auctions do appear to be an essential tool for procurement needs. In a work on public sector procurement in the United States, Wyld and Settoon (2002) found that reverse auctions yield 93% greater returns for public sector agencies than other e-procurement methods. He points out that massive savings - in the billions of dollars - are possible for all levels of government in the U.S., and thus, it is incumbent on governments to pursue these cost saving measures through judicious employment of reverse auctions as a part of an overall e-procurement strategy. As can be seen in Table 2, the latest findings from ISM/Forrester, show a trend up in the use of reverse auctions in the U.S. and this is magnified when you consider that about 42% of large US organisations use E-RA’s in the procurement process. In fact, many of the companies who use online auctions as buyers are reluctant to participate in them when they become a supplier (Manufacturingnews.com, 2001). The online auction is based on the premise that the buyer is being overcharged by its current suppliers, and the online reverse auction will achieve the lowest price. But where does the price reduction come from? Emiliani and Stec (2001) believe that the risk of losing current business coerces suppliers to participate in the auction event. They are electronically coerced to bid by watching other suppliers’ bids in real time. Many analysts (e.g. Wyld, 2000; Deise et.al., 2000) believe that the use of the internet - as a medium for business - provides the opportunity for companies to restructure their supply chains in collaboration with the other supply chain partners. One of the imperatives in the e-procurement model proposed by Wyld (2000) was to build strategic alliances between business partners. This involves both buyers and vendors, working collaboratively to provide cost efficiencies and add value to products and services. Many believe that this strategic collaboration is essential to survive in the e-world. This is the premise of the Value Trust Network (VTN). Raisch (2001) sees the supply chain being enhanced by the established relationships between buyers and suppliers, not just by the adoption of Internet technology. If reverse auction e-procurement is to enhance enterprise competitiveness, then value must be delivered to ease industry pain points, with trust being enhanced between suppliers and buyer (Raisch, 2001; Emiliani & Stec 2002; Jap; 2000). The question that needs to be asked to what extent do reverse online auctions contribute to this value and trust? The whole issue of driving costs down to the lowest possible level would seem to present a serious impediment to the creation of any value or trust (Bartholomew, 2001). The attributes and skills that buyers would like to foster in their suppliers are placed at a lower priority to price. Mozer (2002) questions the elevation of cost savings overs service offerings, suggesting that buyers should be looking for the fairest price for the supplier of choice, rather than the lowest offer. In the example company processes were put into place to protect buyer opportunism and to protect suppliers in the marketplace.
| Q12001 | Q32001 | Q12002 | Q32002 | Q12003 | Q22003 | Q32003 | Q42003 | |
| All % | 15.8 | 20.4 | 23.1 | 22.4 | 27.2 | 26.4 | 25.3 | 25.0 |
Emiliani and Stec (2002) proposed several unresolved questions in their recent study of reverse auctions: · Where does the cost savings come from? · Are reverse auctions one-time events? · Will online auction vendors replace the in-house buying function? · Is there a conflict between supply chain management and online auctions? and · Do online auctions actually increase productivity? The use of the E-RA for strategic sourcing has become popular due to the benefits it can bring to the buyer as shown by our example company - benefits such as significant spend reduction and reduced procurement cycle times. Our example company has found success so far using E-RA’s with agreements negotiated through E-RA coming in at an averaged 15% lower than previous tender/sealed bid negotiated agreements. Other companies such as GlaxoSmithKline and Bechtel (Beall et al, 2003) have averaged 18% and 10% reduction in spend per agreement respectively by using E-RA’s. It can be said that the main benefit that can be derived from holding an E-RA is cost reduction to the buyer, hence there is a feeling of unease amongst suppliers with the concept of electronic reverse auctions. Some organizations, such as the American Subcontractors Association, have publicly stated their opposition to electronic reverse auctions, citing the disadvantages to the supplier and the opportunity of manipulation of the auction by the buyer. Countering this, major users of E-RA’s such as our example company, Volkswagen, Bechtel and METRO Group have put an emphasis on creating an environment of highly ethical practice, with codes of conduct and strict procedures for conducting of E-RA’s. The workings of an E-RA will bring greater transparency to the whole process - bidders do get some form of feedback on theirs and the other party’s bids and in real time. Maybe this level of feedback is too much and hastens the delivery of the awful truth to the losing bidders? As pointed out by Coundouriotis and Ore (2003) one of the main aspects of the E-RA is that it is only one of the tools in the procurement professionals’ kit and for best results, should only be used in the appropriate circumstances. It has its advantages and disadvantages and just like any tool, how it is used, abused or misused determines the results it will give.
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