Paul Ashman, School of Commerce and Management, Southern Cross University, pashman@bigpond.net.au
Allan Ellis, School of Commerce and Management, Southern Cross University allan.ellis@scu.edu.au
Traditionally research into Computer-based training, E-learning and Web-based learning has focused on factors such as immediate overheads or the perceptions of various stakeholder groups. Studies of impact of large scale organizational change, driven by either internal or external factors, on delivery patterns and success levels are rare.
In recent years the Australian Army has moved from a largely training role to an overseas deployed fighting and training role. This paper presents a case study, based upon operational data, which identifies factors influencing the implementation of Web-based learning in response to the Army adopting a complex war-fighting paradigm.
The Australian Army has adopted a Web-based learning as a part of its knowledge management processes, a foundation. The cultural shock accompanying the move away from face-to-face training has been all but eliminated by adopting a Complex War Fighting paradigm. Existing infrastructure is in place not only within Australia but overseas within deployed units. The need and place for Web-based learning is not only observed but articulated by personnel on the ground.
E-learning is now a traditional educational and corporate learning methodology and has been for many years. Do military institutions require any different approaches? The underlying principle of military training is to ensure the capability to enforce a government’s policy when all else fails or called upon by the governing entity. This last bastion of diplomacy must communicate to the opposition government the willingness and ability to: take away their land, break stuff and hurt people. How does this relate to the Web or Web-based training? To address this we must understand the military environment and training goals. While this encompasses traditional educational and corporate learning methodologies, it also must apply to a military, or in this case study, an Armies requirement to impart an instinctive response that may be in conflict with a soldiers moral perspective – to break stuff and hurt people. This will be examined by reviewing the Australian Armies training structures, its complex, operational and future environments.
The investment that any organisation places in training its personnel is more important than basic time and cost considerations. How personnel operate whilst on the job dictates organisational success or failure must be regarded as one of the true measures of training effectiveness. In this case study, this type of investment that the Australian Army has simultaneously a war fighting (including peace keeping / United Nation roles) and learning organization, where it is either training for deployment and operations or is involved in active operations. Within Complex War Fighting, the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Leahy states that:
“Army requires a force with increased flexibility, adaptability and agility. Army must be adept at operating in rapidly changing structures where joint; coalition and multi-agency operations are a matter of course. It is vital to develop highly adaptable and well-protected forces regardless of the nature of the operations on which they are deployed.” Australian Army Web Site 27 Feb 2007 [HREF1]
The Australian Army has created an online learning environment to support its learning communities based upon the experiences of learners and teachers. (Fisher, 2000; Hill and Hall, 2001) Fundamental transformations in geo-politics have influenced Web-based learning practice by complicating the interaction between learner and teacher. In this case the teacher is the Australian Army; however, this has parallels to many organizations that are transitioning to a Web-based information system. The American Society for Training and Development (ASTD) report that organizations are sending fewer employments to classroom based face-to-face courses, opting for e-learning based on cost savings and security (Thompson, Koon, Woodwell and Beauvais, 2002). Thompson et al, report that 77% of organizations had increased use of E-learning from 2001 to 2002. This trend towards training delivered by E-learning increased between 15 - 29%; noting that 20% of Japanese organisations had also reported the delivery of training via the use of technology E-learning (Sugrue, 2004). It is a niche Knowledge Management system that has impacted upon the Army’s training system. This system utilises a full range of training methods; traditional face-to-face delivery dominates formal course delivery. Flexible delivery E-learning/Web-based methods have been increasingly adopted with the original aim, to reduce time and costs restrictions associated with traditional face-to-face delivery methods. Military’s increase in E-learning based training has mirrored ASTDs findings. In reviewing corporate learning for performance, Brennan (2003, p6), noted that “E-learning as entered the period of mass adoption. Training professionals realise that Web-based technologies will play a growing role in the way that training programs are created, managed, and delivered for the foreseeable future”. This however, would come at a cost of a cultural clash between traditional training versus Web-based E-learning products.
Change management involves both soft and hard factors. Some examples of "soft" factors include culture, motivation, communication, and leadership. Newton & Ellis (2005) have extensively reviewed Australian Army’s ‘soft’ change factors. The Australian Army’s fledgling use of Web-based delivery for training, due to infrastructure bandwidth restrictions, is a result of self-restricted technology and cultural resistance, opting instead for a media rich enabled CD-ROM delivery system. Distribution through the use of CD-ROMs was seen as the optimal solution for actively engaging the learner through the use of cinematic video, virtual reality and activity based learning material (Newton & Ellis, 2005). It is now recognised that this medium, while engaging the learner, presented its own cultural resistance by impacting upon the learner/instructor interaction, technical issues in utilising non defence control standards (termed ‘rouge apps’) and doctrinal currency problems inherent in updating CD-ROM media. Hard factors are directly or indirectly measured and their importance can be communicated easily, and can influence change issues quickly. Examples of hard factors would include the time necessary to complete a transformation initiative, number of people involved in executing it, and financial or operational results expected.
Rather than state an over simplified definition of Complex War Fighting, it is worthwhile to understanding in detail the environment of contemporary conflict that any countries Defence Force will be required to operate within, to succeed in the current environment. Several factors influence Complex War Fighting; the first factor is Globalization (Australian Army, 2004). The key environmental concept within Complex War Fighting is the influence of globalization on contemporary conflict. Garzke and Li (2003, p398) identifies the effect of globalisation on world leaders requirement to balance the pursuit of political goals and maintenance of economic stability, they note “it reveals the intensity of leaders' preferences, reducing the need for military contests as a method of identifying mutually acceptable bargains”.
A second factor is the United States
(US) total economic and technological superiority which has rendered US forces
invincible to in conventional one on one conflict, such the Iraq war.
Countries have already experienced Web-based warfare as they find that
Web-based sites on various systems were attacked, targeting government,
businesses and news-media servers (Stanton, 2000). Globalisation partially resulted
in US forces containing other national elements, including Australian forces,
during the Iraq war; however, the conflict was essentially between US economic
and technological capability versus Iraq’s regionally dominant force. For
a group to take arms against the US they must do so by unconventional means,
and whether this is classified as freedom fighters or terrorism will depend
upon political view point. Hassner (2002, p 75) finds the US:
“free from guilt and compassion [due to terrorism] and no longer obliged to take account of frontiers or allies, the United States seemed to have found, in the combination of technological superiority, battle-hardened special forces and local sympathisers, the winning formula that would allow it to impose its order on the world”.
As a consequence this has reduced the likelihood that conventional warfare will be selected as a primary mission for a countries military. A winning formula, initially for Coalition Forces, but long term for unconventional antagonists unless national order can be established.
Complex War Fighting interacts with elements of a conflict environment. These elements represent long-standing fundamentals of warfare: complexity, diffusion, diversity and lethality. Of these, it is the complexity element that has had the most training impact and has forced the Australian Army to modify its Web-based learning practices. Up until till November 2005 Australia’s All Corps training was based upon conventional warfare doctrine and it was not until August 2006 that Complex War Fighting training was adopted nationally. Complexity is caused by the adversary not being a member of a regular armed force, but being an, insurgent, terrorist, criminal and any other organized minority group. This requires forces to be updated at and during the point of contact. This is the pinnacle of just in time training, where troops need to be resourced in order to complete their mission. This is further complicated by the fact that conflict environments have increasing become either urbanized or inhospitable terrain (jungle / mountains) requiring troops to be versatile in their job in widely diverse environments.
An urban environment will contain highly mixed political, ethnic, religious or ideological factional groups. While these groups may very well have tolerated each other, when a military force enters the area and one or more factional groups will react with hostility, complexity arises in separating combatants and non-combatants. This phenomenon has become known as the Three Block War, devised by US Marine Corps GEN Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to describe the complexity of challenges that may be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. Where in three contiguous city blocks a military force will be simultaneously involved in full scale military action, humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations. A major concern for organizations today, revolve around protecting secure commercial information, banking transactions and other sensitive data.
“How do we prepare Marines for the complex, high-stakes, asymmetrical battlefield of the three block war? … As often as not, the really tough issues confronting Marines will be moral quandaries, and they must have the wherewithal to handle them appropriately. While a visceral appreciation for our core values is essential, it alone will not ensure an individual's success in battle or in the myriad potential contingencies short of combat. Much, much more is required to fully prepare a Marine for the rigor of tomorrow's battlefield” (Krulak, 1999, p21).
Whether the organization is a business of or government entity, in a digital environment, information security needs to be protected from external attack (Kumagai, 2001). Information warfare thus forms a part of complex warfare making the issues of confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non repudiation much more critical than before. It is this prevailing environment, reflecting the consequences of Globalization that has influenced the implementation of Web-based learning in response to Army adopting a Complex War Fighting paradigm.
The operating duopoly of a training/operational environment has the distinction of blurring these roles. Soldiers within a 21st century Army are required to train while in theatre (operations) and be able to respond to a complex hostile environment. Conventional training theory, while extant, cannot react fast enough due to inbuilt organizational inertia. Army’s individual training is fundamental to equipping its personnel with the skills, knowledge and attitude to operate within an operational environment. Army has initiated a progressive review of training design and delivery, noting its charter goal is to provide soldiers and officers with the individual skills to make them job ready and succeed in the current geo-political environment.
An Army can encourage but not implant understanding of
geo-politics within a soldier’s learning. As a learning organisation it can
educate both officers and soldiers about the 'how to think' ability that allows
individuals to adapt to uncertainty (Bradford, 2006.) The context of current
geo-politics that the Army is facing in operational areas: Iraq, Afghanistan
and Timor today - forecasts a complex operational environment, where personnel are
threatened and challenged by complicated military and civil situations. Within
this environment, decisions at all levels are not made in isolation. Officers
and soldiers now must balance strategic implications when making immediate
tactical choices. These immediate choices cannot solely rely on doctrinal
training conducted months/years before. Army has recognised the need to refine
training within Army. Doctrine provides Army with the intellectual basis for
the conduct of training and operations. Informed by lessons and refined by
simulation, doctrine will always remain a foundation for our operational
tactics; however, Amy must improve both access to, and responsiveness of:
doctrine, lessons learnt, current and simulation capability in order to prepare
for the challenges of current and future operational environments.
A
danger in uninformed use of technology associated with Web-based course
delivery is shaping teaching and learning activities to fit the technology
rather than using an appropriate technology that fits the activity. “The medium
too often assumes a life of its own, supplanting the teacher and resulting in
technology-bound activities that are debilitating to both teaching and
learning“ (Parker, 1997). A training solution while on operations demands the
basic principles of a comprehensive Web-based learning strategy. Rosenberg
(2001) presents a pathway for the implementation and sustainment for an
organizational e-learning culture. This requires a balance between creating
e-learning based upon sound instructional design and technology, and an
implementation and support strategy. Rosenberg details eleven benefits for e-learning that address
operational training requirements:
Just as these factors can boost business operations they can provide the Army with the competitive edge in its operations. The importance of embedding within military culture to complement operational requirement has been seen. “In essence, technology needs to become as interwoven in institutional strategic planning and educational delivery as it is in society – to become am integral part of teaching and learning throughout the student’s life-long learning environment.” (Schreiber and Berge, 1998). The Australian Army now has the opportunity to exploit Schreiber and Berge’s recommendation with the introduction of Complex Warfare and Hardened Network Army paradigms, see HREF1. However, this must be balanced with Rosenberg (2005) noting, “When great technology meets poor culture, the culture wins every time.” The experience of Army’s key stakeholders in future workplace learning will continue to influence future Web-based transformation. Current research i(Newton and Ellis, 2005 and Charles and Crome, 2005) indicates that training experiences have been overtaken by the technical problems with delivery of the courseware and the attitudes of Senior Officers and Warrant Officers. The attitude of the Chain of Command still causes a barrier to the creation of a workplace Web-based learning culture. Charles and Crome (2005) research identified one commanding officer that considered that E-Learning should be carried out after hours or during leave, demonstrates that education and training is not integral to the workplace despite advertised clams of ‘Army as a learning organisation’. Newton (2005) recognizes that the Chain of Command at every level needs to ensure that subordinates are both supported and encouraged to participate in learning to claim to have a workplace learning culture.
Army in reorientating itself to enable itself to respond to world events has created a situation where change has been mandated to a membership that accepts the requirement to change that has not been seen since World War Two. Case study observations were distilled from both active and passive sources. The observations used were drawn from between 2004-2007 and were from Australian operations and training. What is clear is that soldiers are confident in training and skills and experience. Army (Land Command Training Branch, 2006) has found that high operational and training tempo has resulted in personnel being unable to remain current with their individual training requirements. A large backlog of officers required to attend required career progression Staff Officer Grade Two and Three Staff and Tactics courses. There are also numerous examples of critical career development courses being under-subscribed (current instructor lead courses are run when approximately 70% subscriptions are achieved, with many potential students not being command cleared for attendance due to "pressures of work.
Army’s initial Web-based learning strategies were not a result of operations. As a consequence of poor course attendance by individuals on career progression courses, the Chief of the Army has made attendance the highest priority. Commanders have been informed not to make individuals unavailable for courses due to collective unit based training or other administrative requirements. Units faced with a conundrum of ensuring that their units are ready for deployment and sending staff on prolonged courses, challenged Training Command to reduce the time burden. Training Command in response developed CD-ROM based material as a part of pre-course training; however, this was to allow course curriculums to include additional mandated training without extending the length of a course. This has exacerbated the problem with up to two weeks training required to complete a five CD-ROM training component and at the individuals unit prior to attending the course. Consequently, Training Command is developing Web-based learning strategies that will encompass a whole of life competency approach. Individual completing Web-based courses are able to plan well in advance in order to de-conflict against other critical activities. This is changing Army’s just in time training approach. Unit Commanders have been cautioned that poor planning of such progressions constitutes a failure of command responsibilities, demonstrates poor leadership, and affects morale.
Defence has established a Directorate of Flexible Learning Solutions (DFLS). Defence Web-based is an online Web-based system known as CAMPUS, which provides computer-based access to courses and learning materials. The DFLS is responsible for the deployment of training and education materials through CAMPUS, through the Defence Intranet. These training materials may be service specific eg Army or Tri-Service in nature, Navy, Army or Air Force. The Directorate develops policy and strategies to support the implementation of flexible learning solutions, including Web-based across Defence within Australia. Courses that are currently available on CAMPUS do not contribute to any formal qualifications; they are designed as proficiency based courses, not competency based. While the aim of CAMPUS is to provide the Defence with an integrated learning management system and learning content management system for technology supported training and educational opportunities. At this point DFLS has no policy in respect to specifically supplying Web-based solutions to deployed troops. DFLS rely on respective services to ensure their personnel have connectivity to Defence’s Intranet. The DFLS Director points out that while their system was developed in 2000, Navy have not had connectivity for ‘ships at sea’ to the CAMPUS training therefore no specific infrastructure for Army units has been forecast.
Above this is the structural content of the Web-based learning content. Trainees are actively evaluated via questionnaire and their results analyzed. Trainees question the need to commit large volumes of facts to memory, where in practice they would use manuals or the Internet to find the answer. Trainee’s comment that they are being tested on learning questions that detracts from the learning experience offered by the course. “The questions are too restrictive – requiring exact repetition as opposed to ensuring students have an understanding of the concepts” (Buck, 2006, p4). This type of assessment focuses on learning answers to questions rather than the information contained in the lesson. Research showed that there are inherent difficulties in Army’s computer-based assessment or eAssessment. Army’s eAssessment must focus on relevance; future content reviews must focus on succinct questions that engage the learner within a workplace context. Improvement to the Australian Army’s E-Assessment techniques will rely on its instructional designers to work with subject matter experts to ensure vocational competence. Newton and Ellis (2005) have extensively reviewed the Australian Army’s technical learning infrastructure. As noted in the Nesta Futurelab Series (2004), the format E-Assessment is not restricted and has the ability to including automating administrative procedures; digitizing paper-based systems, and online testing – encompassing the spectrum of multiple choice tests to interactive problem-solving assessment. Out of the scope of this paper but highlighted in Buck work is the lack of understanding of E-Assessment processes and imagination. The Australian Army is yet to embrace a wider range of web-based assessment evident in some of its CD ROM based E-learning products – especially utilizing flash based game assessment.
The next phase id to get both E-Learning and E-Assessment to the workforce. Land Command (LCOMD) is responsible for planning and conducting all of Army’s land based operations. LCOMD utilizes the Army Capability Management System (ACMS) which is a Web-based information management system that records and provides a means for the management of resources support, activities and lessons. ACMS is supported by a comprehensive set of Web-based tools form of the ACMS software package available on both the Defence Restricted Network and Defence Secret Network. ACMS is Army’s corporate resource data management system and is an essential element in getting LCOMD training properly resourced and its readiness requirements addressed. While Web-based learning infra-structure has been absorbed into Defence’s intranet a simultaneous requirement has developed for operational deployment through ACMS. The net effect is a deployed force’s base will have connectivity to a supporting Defence network. This has enabled troops to expect all the benefits that this brings, most importantly is email; however, with longer deployments opportunities for soldiers to continue training.
Wong’s 2004 review that Junior Leaders are learning to make decisions in chaotic conditions, to be mentally agile in executing both ‘counterinsurgency’ and ‘nation-building’ operations simultaneously. Wong warns that we must now acknowledge and encourage this newly developed adaptability in our junior leaders or risk stifling the innovation critically needed in Army’s future leaders. Part of this strategy is not to deny the type of information or training required and available via Web-based learning. Complexity for a junior leader in an operational environment may consist of dealing with complicated personnel issues, logistics, maintenance, or preparing and participating in an operational exercise such as a patrolling or convoy protection. While on operations in environments like Iraq and Afghanistan, the complexity for junior leaders comes from wider sources. One significant source of complexity is the number and nature of roles that junior officers must fill in ‘counterinsurgency’ and ‘nation-building’ operations. Examining the roles required of junior officers the question is not which role, but how many? One officer noted, “You are not just trying to learn one job, you are trying to learn several dozen jobs. Everything from being a politician to being a war commander. That is just an incredible amount of information for someone to carry around in their head.” Web-based performance support systems would fill the requirement for leaders to be able to master situations. This is evident with reported situations where conflict has arisen through dealing with indigenous personnel. Typically when a soldier comes into contact with a situation that their training has not prepared them for they may only have radio communication with a superior headquarters.
A Web-based performance support system would be utilized to review the circumstance and provide alternative solutions much in the way that Pantridge and Geddes (1967) pioneered the concept of providing advanced cardiac life support care to cardiac arrest victims outside of hospitals with mobile intensive care vehicles in Belfast. Instead of a doctor supplying information a Web-based database could draw upon all data or training that relates to the situation.
Compounding these issues are reports of the use of ‘coalition’ equipment and mastering the physical environment. Non standard equipment often occurs as the result of the failure to supply or perceived the need that a coalition force, usual US, is supplied. One officer noted that being deployed away from his main base, that they had no intranet connection and were not able to receive email unless they made the journey back to base. However, when US forces arrived they brought a satellite connection that enabled them to link back into the network. The only problem then lay with the topography of the area as satellite dishes were pointed almost directly at the horizon. Any sun spot activity would interrupt the connection. Once this connection was established they had the ability to connect to Defence’s entire intranet Web-based resources.
Army has an expectation of training excellence not restricted in scope to a particular skill or area. Training conducted in a specific field, technology, procedure or drill provides measurable results. Miller and Kerr (2002) note that historically, coaching has been preoccupied with enhancing athletes’ physical, technical and strategic skills. Observations support Miller and Kerr’s claim and suggest that Army’s current competency based training system is being incorrectly applied. Army culture has relied upon this form of physical hands on instruction. Instructors behaviourist approach has thwarted any added valued that Web-based training provided. This extended to the areas of training development, the articulation of competency in terms of standards and workplace requirements, coupled with poor validation. The way Army sees its own training system needs to be revised. Evidence shows that the most important learning occurs in units and the workplace rather than as a result of formal instruction on courses.
Application of national RTO Vocational Education Training (VET) has redefined future assessment schemes. Gone is the formative / summative system with associated training enablers. Competency based training requires summative assessment complete with constructive feedback. Buck (2006) notes that question-bank security was a reason for not supplying feedback; especially in an E-Assessment situation, where if feedback was provided trainees would collaboratively collect a bank of questions and answers. The Australian Army is reversing this problem by establishing a collective bank of lesson learnt. A future based concept is now applied to the results found in this case study.
Army’s next operation deployment will acknowledge that the interaction of its soldiers and junior leaders with the operational environment will not be able to be trained for. Soldiers will interact with new equipment, leaders be faced with social, cultural and physical elements never before encountered. How would a Web-based learning system overcome current shortfalls, given that the infra-structure for this system already exists in today’s Army / Defence Force? Figure 1 represents a proposed Web-based training concept. The figure represents how a soldier/junior leader and leader/manager would interact with a Web-based training to bolster and or facilitate learning on the job. While soft skill training will be available ‘in barracks’ the advantage that Web-base learning gives an organisation like Army is to maintain the momentum, never allowing the enemy to see that it has introduced an unknown that can be exploited. While this representation does not factor in security implications, the advances in data bit encryption and digital signature recognition, this issue does not impinge on the models validity. Organizations that allow personnel to tap into such knowledge bases will have a tactical advantage that can be exploited more strategically at higher levels.
The Australian Army is definitely starting to embrace a Web-base training strategy that moves outside of the classroom. And rather than being represented as a vehicle that can replace classroom / face-to-face training based upon cost or convenience. The dynamic nature of this concept means that lessons learnt in one operational theatre could be equally relevant in another. Given that the current complex war-fighting environment that the Australian Army finds itself a Web-based environment is called for. Noting that current server based networks are increasingly utilizing Web-based interfaces. The future of training will continue to utilise a blended learning approach, as stated, E-learning is now a traditional learning methodology. As Army’s network capability increases bandwidth and improvements to CODECs reduces bandwidth reliance, Army’s Web-based learning content will emulate the CD ROM based communication and interactivity levels of 1999 - 2003.
Figure 1: A Future Web-based Training Concept
As a result of globalisation, the introduction of Complex War Fighting as a Web-based change agent has overcome some of the traditional soft change factors faced by Army in the past. The aim now is not only to improve efficiency but also to improve Army’s training effectiveness and to manage it more strategically. We have seen that Army needs to review how it approaches both training and its training model. Leadership and managerial tasks have become more complex, changing the nature and quality of the required information. Web-based learning systems meet the required changes to Army’s training process. We have seen that the Web adds to the whole process and adds by varying training from structured, routine support to, more open unstructured, enabling complex enquiries to be addressed at every level of management.
A similar effect of globalisation on all organisations would see the rapid change in the adoption of Web-based learning as a solution to an uncertain business environment, allowing workforce performance to be more even, despite the existence of unpredictable scenarios. An organizations’ ability to identify the relevant information needed to make important decisions is crucial, since the access to Web-based learning data, used to generate information for decision making is not restricted by manual systems of the organization.
Role of the Web in delivering training within the
workplace comes at a time when information can record, synthesize, analyse and
disseminated quicker than at any other time in history. The advantage of
Web-based learning is that information can be collected from every part of the
organisation and its external environment and brought together to provide
relevant, timely, concise and precise information at all levels of the
organization.
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